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Archive for March 2011

DEFAMATION: Denis O’Brien,Proinsias DeRossa and David Beckham.The law now in Ireland, Europe + the U.S

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The Defamation Bill 2006 became law in 2009 with the new Defamation Act 2009 and came into effect on January 1st 2010. The new legislation abolishes the distinction between libel and slander and now there is just one claim of ‘defamation’ in its place. While the constitutional right to freedom of expression is a pertinent right and should not be curtailed in any way, it should not be abused either and the new Act sets out that it “shall protect the public interest by ensuring ethical, accurate and truthful reporting; maintain certain minimum ethical and professional standards; and ensure the privacy and dignity of the individual is protected”.

Some differences that arise in the 2009 Act, which repeals the previous Act of 1961,for example, are that proceedings must be brought within one year as oppose to the previous six years; an apology will not be regarded as an admission of liability; a money lodgement into court will not have to be joined by an admission of liability as was the previous case. Another addition this new Act brings into being is that an individual can bring a case in the Circuit Court for vindication of his good name without a claim in damages. The defences in an action to defamation have been considered and some changes or amendments have been made. The defences that can arise include truth, honest opinion, absolute and qualified privilege, consent to publication, fair and reasonable publication. This last defence is a new one under the 2009 Act and relates to matters of public importance. It is a new protection and will likely be used by newspapers where the accuracy of certain statements may be questionable.

Section 31 of the new Act allows submissions to be made and juries to be addressed and advised in relation to damages. This is likely to have been brought about after recent decisions in the Courts where damages awarded by juries have been said to be inordinately excessive. In O’Brien v Mirror Group Newspapers, Denis O’Brien successfully brought a claim against the Defendant newspaper in regard to an article containing an unsubstantiated allegation of bribing a politician. The jury awarded a sum of €317,000 which was found by the Supreme Court to be disproportionate and a retrial was ordered. The second jury awarded Mr O’Brian €750,000. The new Act now provides for the Supreme Court, on appeal, the power to substitute its own figures for that of the juries if an award is deemed to be excessive. This is not necessarily consistent with the European Court of Human Rights comments in DeRossa v Independent Newspapers. In that case the ECHR found an award of €381,000 which had been approved by the Supreme Court, not to be excessive. The European Court refused to accept arguments made that a jury should be guided on damages.

The new Act does not bring about a significant change in the law but somewhat modernises it and tightens up the area. It should be noted that the Irish and English legal systems and the relevant Acts provide more protection than, for example, in the American legal system. In the recent David Beckham case, the soccer player failed in a £15.5 million libel suit against In Touch US magazine after the magazine published an article claiming Beckham cheated on his wife with a prostitute for £2,000 per night. The prostitute in question, Ms Irma Nici sold her story to In Touch claiming that herself and another “mystery brunette” woman had sex with Beckham in August 2007 in New York’s Le Parker Meridien Hotel.

Under US law, unlike Irish law; a claimant has to prove that the publisher acted “with malice” and Beckham’s lawyers failed to establish this in his case. Judge Manuel Real dismissed his action in a Los Angeles Court house in February and stated that Beckham was in the public domain and that there was a public interest element in relation to his personal life. He further pointed out that Ms Nici had a constitutional right to “freedom of expression” and could essentially say what she wanted. Beckham’s spokesman stated that “unfortunately, the US legal system requires us to show that the magazine acted maliciously… any acknowledgeable person knows this story not to be true, and we will continue to fight this in court and the decision will be appealed”. There was no evidence against Beckham other than Ms Nici’s account of events and Beckham had put forward evidence showing he had been staying at another hotel and could not have been in the Le Parker Meridien Hotel as claimed.

[It should be noted that a similar law suit was filed in Germany against Bauer Publishing Co. (In Touch magazines German owner) in which Beckham succeeded in his claim and is awaiting damages to be paid.]

LegalEagleStar,  Wednesday, 23 rd March,  2011

Why are the Banks allowed repossess Your Home ??

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Over the past number of months it has become a common occurrence for Banks to take a strong stance against customers who default on their debts and in particular against those it sees as the most vulnerable i.e. those who are having difficulty in making the repayments on their mortgages. Make no mistake about it, it is because of the ‘security’ the Banks hold i.e. the title deeds to your Home that has spurred them on to take such actions.

The consequences of the Banks actions have devastating effects. Not only is the loss or threatened loss of your Home devastating by itself but the consequences of  same can be far-reaching. Daily, we are reading in the newspapers and other media of families being tossed out onto the streets and needing rehousing which in itself is dreadful but the number of family breakups, children having their lives devastated and the mental and physical illness associated with this are numerous and tragic. I have personally seen one or other of the parents desert the family as they feel useless and unable to cope, as well as one parent tragically, taking their own life as they felt demoralised and a ‘failure’. Society is finding it very difficult to cope with the Banks and the consequences of their actions.

There are always those in our society who for one reason or another default on their mortgages. Tragic they all are, but some have been understandable. I am talking about Family Homes here not the repossession of holiday or second homes, property investments and such like. The loss of their job by the sole provider to the family, can and does have consequences. In the past an arrangement could be made with the Bank to get people over short-term problems. Today the problems experienced by the majority are long-term and need another solution. Many engage and talk with their Bank and come to some sort of arrangement but without the prospect of reemployment at some stage in the near future, such arrangements are of no use and are certain to fail.

Let’s look at the actions of the Banks in the context of Ireland 2011 where the State have taken over the liabilities of the Banks. That’s right, we the tax payer are now, as a result of the actions of our elected Government, liable for the debts of the Banks. Not only that but we are being told, not asked, to pay further sums as necessary into these Banks in order that they can continue to operate. So the citizens of this country who are being thrown out of their homes, are at the same time subsidising these self-same Banks. Is there not something immoral about all this? Our Judges see this immorality in action in the Courts on a daily basis and are clearly frustrated. They call on people in such cases to come before the Courts and do everything within their power to help them. It is unfortunately just putting off the inevitable as today people are losing hope and the ability to deal with their financial responsibilities in a realistic manner.

It always amazes me how quick our politicians are in funding the Banks to whatever level is required while at the same time are unwilling to support those in our society who are suffering the most hardship. In the latter case a little goes a long way while for the former it seems a black bottomless pit. In our system of justice, when a business is in trouble it is prudent to have the Courts appoint a Receiver or Examiner who takes control of the business to see if it is sustainable and then reorganise the business , under the protection of the Court, and gives it time to reorganise itself. Then decisions are made to come out of receivership/administration to continue to trade or else the business is sold to willing buyers. The last scenario is where the company is wound up. Why the Banks have not been dealt with in a similar manner but instead are being handed a taxpayer bailout is beyond me.  One law for Irish businesses while another, taxpayer bailout, seems exclusive for dealing with the Banks. We are told that Society as we know it, will collapse if we cannot get money out of the ATM machines. Well, I remember a sustained Bank Strike in the 1970’s/ 80’s when the Banks remained closed for several months and society just got on with their businesses while suffering the consequences of the disruption. Society did not fall apart !

I know that we lawyers will always give the underdog a defence and not see injustice done for lack of legal representation but we have to seriously question our actions in representing the interests of the Banks while causing indeterminable suffering to the citizens of the State. Of course we cannot refer to the banks as the underdog in any fashion as they clearly have acted and continue to act as though Society owes them a living. What other business today in Ireland would receive such unconditional support from the State? Why do we not have  leaders who put the interests of the citizen first and foremost and deal with the Banks and other such institutions in a way that reflects the true values of our Society? We should look to our Constitution and the equality of all. Something has gone seriously wrong with our Society for us to find ourselves in such an outrageous position.

So saving the Banks at all costs to enable society to function is in itself destabilising the same society it is claimed to support. Legally the banks are quite entitled to seek repossession of customers homes when the Mortgage is in default but such actions are in themselves causing the breakup of society as we know it. Something needs to change and to change immediately. Politicians of all Parties and Independents need to step in and cure this blight on our society before it is too late and the fabric of society as we know it no longer exists.


LegalEagleStar , Wednesday , 16th March, 2011

Recognition of Foreign Divorces by Irish Courts

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Q:   I have been living in Ireland for four years and moved here because my husband was offered a job. We are from Paraguay and not long after we arrived here we separated. I wanted to get a divorce here but didn’t want to wait four years and since we married in Paraguay and were from there originally my husband wanted to get divorced there, so I agreed. We flew to Paraguay, got our divorce and flew back. My husband sometimes threatens that he will not pay his maintenance and there is no security for the maintenance and now I understand that I could have gotten what is called a judicial separation here and I was wondering if I still can?


A: When the parties moved to Ireland,   did they form the intention that they were to move to this jurisdiction indefinitely? If the answer is yes it poses the question whether their place of domicile changed from Paraguay to Ireland. Further, I believe that the wife should obtain what is called an Affidavit of Laws from a Paraguayan lawyer so as to confirm the validity of the Paraguayan Divorce, in circumstances where neither of the parties were resident in Paraguay at the time of the application for the divorce.


The Domicile and Recognition of Foreign Divorces Act, 1986 governs the recognition of foreign divorces that were applied for after the 2nd of October 1986. Section 5(1) provides: “For the rule of law that a divorce is recognised if granted in a country where both spouses are domiciled, there is hereby substituted a rule that a divorce shall be recognised if granted in the country where either spouse is domiciled”. This means that if either spouse was domiciled in the jurisdiction granting the divorce at the date the proceedings were initiated, the divorce is entitled to recognition in Ireland. Thus, when a court recognises a foreign divorce decree the parties are seen by Irish law as being validly divorced.

Therefore, even if the wife in this case argued that she had moved to Ireland with the intention of never moving back to Paraguay and it was found that her domicile had changed to Ireland, if her husband still claimed Paraguayan domicile, that would be enough for the divorce to be recognised in the Irish courts.

Section 29 of The Family Law Act, 1995provides that “an application can be made under s.29 seeking a declaration that a foreign divorce is entitled to recognition in Ireland.”

Part III of the 1995 Act introduced a procedure whereby a person who was divorced abroad after 1st August 1996 can apply for certain reliefs in Ireland. Reliefs may also be applied for in relation to any dependant family members. Most reliefs under the 1995 Act are available save for preliminary reliefs. A person does not have an automatic right to apply for such reliefs and therefore an Applicant must get the leave of the court by way of an ex parte application. The court will only grant leave where it finds that there is a substantial ground for doing so and that at least one requirement under section 27 is established. Section 27 states:

27.—(1) Subject to subsection (2), the court may make a relief order if, but only if, at least one of the following requirements is satisfied:

( a ) either of the spouses concerned was domiciled in the State on the date of the application for an order under section 23 (3) in relation to the relief order or was so domiciled on the date on which the divorce or judicial separation concerned took effect in the country or jurisdiction in which it was obtained,

( b ) either of the spouses was ordinarily resident in the State throughout the period of one year ending on either of the dates aforesaid;

( c ) on the date of the institution of the proceedings aforesaid either or both of the spouses had a beneficial interest in land situated in the State.

Section 23(3) mentioned in s.27(1)(a) relates to the ex parte application stage. The court must also be satisfied that, in all the circumstances of the case, that such an order is appropriate. In considering what is appropriate, the court shall have regard to the matters set out in Section 26 of the Act:

26.—The court shall not make a relief order unless it is satisfied that in all the circumstances of the particular case it is appropriate that such an order should be made by a court in the State and, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, in deciding whether to make a relief order, the court shall, in particular, have regard to the following matters:

( a ) the connection which the spouses concerned have with the State,
( b ) the connection which the spouses have with the country or jurisdiction other than the State in which the marriage concerned was dissolved or in which they were legally separated,
( c ) the connection which the spouses have with any country or jurisdiction other than the State,
( d ) any financial benefit which the spouse applying for the making of the order (“the applicant”) or a dependent member of the family has received, or is likely to receive, in consequence of the divorce or legal separation concerned or by virtue of any agreement or the operation of the law of a country or jurisdiction other than the State,
( e ) in a case where an order has been made by a court in a country or jurisdiction other than the State requiring a spouse, or the spouses, concerned to make any payment or transfer any property for the benefit of the applicant or a dependent member of the family, the financial relief given by the order and the extent to which the order has been complied with or is likely to be complied with,
( f ) any right which the applicant or a dependent member of the family has, or has had, to apply for financial relief from a spouse or the spouses under the law of any country or jurisdiction other than the State and, if the applicant or dependent member of the family has omitted to exercise any such right, the reason for that omission,
( g ) the availability in the State of any property in respect of which a relief order in favour of the applicant or dependent member of the family could be made,
( h ) the extent to which the relief order is likely to be enforceable,
( i ) the length of time which has elapsed since the date of the divorce or legal separation concerned.

Case Law

In what can be quite a complex area of the law, it is important to examine the case law that has emerged in the area. In MEC v JAC [2001] 2 IR 399 – The High Court (Kinlen J.) held, in granting the relief sought,

1. that the courts of Ireland would recognise a decree of divorce if either spouse was domiciled in the jurisdiction in which the divorce proceedings were instituted at the time those proceedings were instituted.

2. That, as both the Applicant and Respondent were domiciled in Ireland at the time of the divorce, the decree could not be recognised in the State.

3. That any suggested radical change in the hitherto accepted law should more properly be effected by statute and the fact that the Oireachtas was slow to deal with many problems in the matrimonial field did not of itself give support to the court’s jurisdiction to legislate.

DT v FL [2009] 1 IR 435 (Supreme Court) – The parties were Irish citizens and were married in Ireland in 1980. The parties and their three children moved to the Netherlands in 1987. Upon the breakdown of the marriage in 1993 the Applicant returned to Ireland with the three children. The Respondent remained in the Netherlands. In 1993 the Applicant issued proceedings in the District Court of Rotterdam seeking maintenance for her and the children. The Applicant did not seek a decree of divorce. The Respondent instituted proceedings in 1994 in the District Court of Rotterdam seeking a decree of divorce. The Applicant did not object to the relief being granted and sought orders for maintenance for her and the children and also for custody of the children. The District Court of Rotterdam accepted jurisdiction on the basis of the Respondent’s residence in the Netherlands for more than twelve months. A decree of divorce was granted along with an order for spousal maintenance in favour of the Applicant. The Applicant instituted family law proceedings against the respondent in 2000, in Ireland, seeking a decree of judicial separation and ancillary orders. The Respondent sought a declaration that the decree of divorce obtained in the Netherlands should be recognised in the State. The High Court (Morris P.) refused the declaration and held that the Respondent was domiciled in Ireland and that residence was not a basis for recognising the divorce obtained in the Netherlands. The Respondent appealed to the Supreme Court which dismissed the appeal.

It must be noted that with the coming into force of either Brussels I (2001) or Brussels II (2003), the above decision could well have been different. However, since Paraguay is not a party to Brussels I or Brussels II, the decision is still relevant.

MR v PR[2005] 2 IR 618 – In considering the ex parte stage of Part III of the 1995 Act, Judge Quirke in the High Court, in refusing to set aside the granting of leave and in granting the relief sought by the Applicant, held that an Irish court should not interfere with, supplement or adjust an order of divorce obtained in a foreign court save in exceptional circumstances, and only when satisfied that the outcome of those proceedings had been unfair or unjust and that no remedy was available to the Applicant in that jurisdiction.

PWY v PC [2008] 2 IR 262 – The parties to the proceedings had been divorced in Hong Kong in 2002 and were now living in Ireland. The Respondent sought an order setting aside an order of the High Court which granted the Applicant leave to seek relief pursuant to Part III of the Family Law Act 1995. Sheehan J in the High Court held that, in setting aside the order which granted the Applicant leave and refusing a further application for leave,

1. , that the court had an inherent jurisdiction to set aside an order granting leave to apply for relief pursuant to s. 23(3) of the Family Law Act 1995 that had been made on the basis of an ex parte application, including cases where there was an absence of mala fides.

2. That the inherent jurisdiction to set aside an order granting leave, which had been made on the basis of an ex parte application, should only be used in exceptional cases. Material non-disclosure of a serious nature in an application where leave was obtained constituted such an exceptional case.

3.      That the court had no jurisdiction to grant leave unless one of the requirements of s. 27 of the Family Law Act 1995 was met. The court should look at ss. 23 and 26 together when assessing whether to grant leave. An Applicant must have established a substantial ground and have established that a court in this State was the most appropriate venue for hearing the application. Inherent in the notion of a substantial ground was the appropriateness of an order being made by a court in this State.

4.      That the requirements to obtain leave under ss. 23 and 26 of the Family Law Act 1995 and the factors to consider when establishing jurisdiction, should be taken in conjunction. It was not necessary to show hardship or injustice in considering whether there was a substantial ground for an application and regard must have been had to comity and forum non conveniens.

Agbaje v Agbaje[2009] 1 FLR 987– This was another English case considering the equivalent English legislation. The parties were a Nigerian couple who had spent most of their 32-year marriage in Nigeria, although they had also spent some time living in England, and had acquired British citizenship. The husband owned a property in London, which was used as a base while visiting the children of the family, who were being educated in England. After the separation the wife moved from the matrimonial home in Nigeria to the English property. The husband applied for a divorce in Nigeria. Four months later the wife petitioned for a divorce in England, and then filed an answer and cross-petition in the Nigerian divorce proceedings, seeking ancillary relief in the form of a lump sum worth about £42,000 and property transfers worth about £500,000. The Nigerian court refused to stay the Nigerian proceedings, and shortly afterwards the English court dismissed the wife’s application for an anti-suit injunction against the husband, on the basis that ‘there was no evidence that substantial justice could not be obtained by the wife in the courts of Nigeria’ and no ‘cogent evidence that England is the natural forum for the decision-making process in relation to these parties’ divorce’. Ultimately the Nigerian court granted the husband a divorce, awarding the wife a life interest in the matrimonial home in Nigeria, which was worth about £83,000, (the court had no power to make a property transfer order), plus a lump sum payment of £21,000 as ‘maintenance for life’. The husband retained assets of about £616,000, including two properties in London. The wife then sought leave, without notice, to issue an application for financial relief following an overseas divorce, pursuant to Pt III of the Family Proceedings Act 1984. The leave judge produced a short judgment granting the wife leave. However, on the husband’s application to set aside the leave, the leave judge produced a much longer judgment, setting out in some detail his reasons for concluding that there were exceptional circumstances and that the wife would suffer real hardship unless leave were given. The Court of Appeal refused the husband permission to appeal the grant of leave. The trial judge, who placed considerable reliance on the judgment given by the leave judge, eventually awarded the wife £275,000 from the sale of the English property, on condition that she transfer her life interest in the Nigerian property to the husband. The husband’s appeal raised questions as to: (i) the proper scope and role of the leave application and the essential difference between the leave application and the substantive application; (ii) the purpose of the 1984 Act; (iii) what account should be taken of comity and rules of forum; and (iv) when it was ‘appropriate’ to order financial relief under Pt III.

Held – allowing the husband’s appeal and dismissing the wife’s claim for relief under Pt III –

1. The permission stage was intended to give the potential respondent adequate protection against having to present a strong defence at substantial cost; it was also intended to provide some measure of protection against the possibility of applications being used to exert improper pressure to settle in order to avoid the expense of contesting an application. At the without notice permission stage the judicial task was to decide whether there was a ‘substantial ground’ for making the order, on the basis of a quick impressionistic assessment of the merits, bearing in mind that the object of the exercise was to weed out the weak case.

2. The purpose of the jurisdiction to award financial relief after an overseas divorce, under Pt III of the Family Proceedings Act 1984 was to remit hardship in the exceptional case in which serious injustice would otherwise be done.

3. Comity between courts of competing jurisdiction had a significant influence on the way in which the decision under Pt III had to be taken. Although the importance of comity and the forum conveniens rules ought not to be pressed too far, it was necessary, for the sake of consistency, to pay close regard to the interests of justice as they would have affected a stay of the English proceedings, and such interests of justice as would require the correction of the order made by the foreign court.

4. The focus should be on whether, objectively speaking, substantial justice or injustice had been done overseas, a fortiori when the foreign court was the appropriate forum for granting the divorce and regulating the financial consequences of the dissolution. It would be wrong to focus simply upon a comparison between the size of the overseas award and the size of the potential award in England; whilst disparity was an obvious factor, it should not be permitted to dominate. If the appropriate court had made an appropriate order, the court might well be satisfied, ordinarily, that it was not appropriate to make a further order under Pt III.

5. The judge had erred in principle. The trial judge had not referred to the couple’s connection with Nigeria when dealing with s 16, although the connection with the divorce court was a factor that merited particular attention, and was a more weighty factor than the connection the parties had with England and Wales. The judge had not addressed the need for respect and deference to be paid to the Nigerian court, although comity between this jurisdiction and a Commonwealth jurisdiction that had largely embraced our traditions was an important factor in the case. The judge had not addressed expressly the award made by the Nigerian court, and whether a serious injustice had been done to the wife in Nigeria. Finally, the judge had failed to explain why this was an exceptional case in which the wife should be allowed a second bite of the cherry

6. The husband and wife had a more significant connection with Nigeria than with England, and Nigeria, not England, was the natural and appropriate forum for resolution of the wife’s claims. No substantial injustice had been done to the wife in Nigeria. Although it was plain that the wife would suffer real hardship in England and Wales, because she had exhausted the lump sum designed to provide for her sustenance in Nigeria, comity commanded respect for the overseas order


The querist and her husband are both Paraguayan  nationals who were married in Paraguay and their connection with Ireland has only been in existence for the previous four years. It is unlikely that their domicile has changed to Ireland unless they formed the intention to come to Ireland and stay in the jurisdiction indefinitely or since relocating to Ireland they formed this intention. The residency factor is something to take into account when deciding on whether a person’s place of domicile has changed, however, it has been said that the domicile of origin persists until it has been clearly shown to have changed (Re Joyce [1946] IR 277). Even if the Applicant formed the view that her domicile was in Ireland, unless the Respondent formed a similar view, he could still rely on section 5(1) of the Domicile and Recognition of Foreign Divorces Act, 1986, stating that his domicile was always Paraguay and therefore the Paraguayan Divorce would have been obtained legally and in return capable of recognition in this jurisdiction. I am not aware if there are any residency requirements in relation to a Paraguayan divorce where both parties are Paraguayan nationals who were married in Paraguay. An Affidavit of laws might need to be obtained in order to clarify the validity of the Paraguayan divorce and the law and rules in relation to obtaining a divorce in Paraguay. If residency is not a factor and the parties were therefore validly divorced in Paraguay, under the Domicile and Recognition of Foreign Divorces Act, 1986,  an Irish court recognises a foreign divorce decree and the parties are seen by Irish law as being validly divorced. In effect an Order for Judicial Separation could not be sought in the Irish Courts.

Part III of the 1995 Act states that firstly leave must be granted in order to apply for such relief. Part III says that a court will only grant leave where it finds that there is a substantial ground for doing so and that at least one requirement found under section 27 is established. The Applicant in this case could satisfy the requirement set out in section 27(1)(b) which states that “either of the spouses was ordinarily resident in the State throughout the period of one year ending on either of the dates aforesaid”

The court must also find that there is a substantial ground for granting relief at this first stage in the process. In deciding whether there is a substantial ground and whether it is appropriate to grant leave, the court looks to section 26. In considering section 26(a)-26(i) I believe that unless there is some evidence that the Respondent has or will default in paying maintenance in the future, it is my opinion that there is strong grounds for not getting through the leave stage.

I believe that the recent case of DT v FL [2009] 1 IR435 is very relevant to the case at hand. After living in the Netherlands since 1987, the court still found that in 2000 the Respondent was still domiciled in Ireland. In applying the facts, I believe that both parties would still be found to be domiciled in Paraguay. The court found in DT v FL that both parties domicile was Ireland and this overrode the Netherlands divorce where the Netherlands courts had accepted jurisdiction on the basis that residency factors had been satisfied.

I believe that the cases of MR v PR[2005] 2 IR 618,PWY v PC [2008] 2 IR 262,Agbaje v Agbaje[2009] 1 FLR 987 are all relevant to the case at hand. Although two of the decisions are English and not binding on an Irish court, the legislation in this area of the law is similar and the decisions could be found to be persuasive to an Irish Judge. I outlined the facts as I found them to be very relevant to the facts of the case at hand. In MR v PR Quirke J in the Irish High Court stated that a court should not interfere with a decision of a foreign court save where there is exceptional circumstances and that the outcome of the foreign court proceedings had been unfair or unjust and that no remedy was available to the applicant in that jurisdiction. In applying this case to the facts, I do not believe that a court would find that an exceptional circumstance is the fact that there is no security for maintenance for the Applicant and that the Paraguayan Divorce was unfair or unjust to the Applicant. It is therefore, in my opinion, that an application by the Applicant under Part III would not be successful.

LegalEagleStar , Wednesday , 9th March ,  2011

Written by LegalEagleStar

March 9, 2011 at 1:55 pm


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Q.  I have recently received a request for the payment of my annual Ground Rent – a small annual sum. Along with the request for payment was an offer to buy out the ground rent to my house for a couple of hundred Euro. Do you think I should take up this offer?



A.  Some people already own the Freehold Title to their house and therefore the question of ground rent – or buying it out – does not arise. In other cases people might hold the Leasehold Title to their house and the issue will then arise.  The question of buying out the Ground Rent does not arise in regard to Apartments.


In the first instance you should check your Title Deeds to ascertain what interest you hold and if in any doubt consult a Solicitor.


In the case of people who hold the Leasehold Title as a general rule if there is less than 70 years left to run under their Lease then steps should be taken to buy out the Ground Rent. The situation becomes critical when there is less than 15 years remaining on your Lease as it becomes considerably more expensive as each year passes to buy out the Ground Rent. If the Lease expires you could end up paying up to one eight of the market price of your house.


However many people may find that they hold under a long Lease with more than a hundred years to run. A lot of people hold under a 150 year lease or indeed 999 years ! In that case they may not need to buy out their Ground Rent at all but there are a few cases where they may wish to do so. If , for example, there is a restrictive covenant preventing them from doing something with their property – such as building a house in a side garden which they wish to do  – they might then buy out the Ground Rent i.e. acquire the Freehold Title. In other cases the Freehold might be acquired where there is some problem with the title such as where some title documents have been lost or mislaid.


The important thing to remember is that if one does buy out the Ground Rent and thereby acquire the Freehold Title one should ensure that once the procedure is started that it is then completed. Under the consent procedure certain forms may be signed such as Consent Forms and these should be lodged in the Ground Rents Section of the Property Registration Authority in order to acquire what, in most cases, will be a Vesting Certificate. One should be careful not to lose this document as it is important and one should ensure that it is properly registered. It may have to be registered in the Registry of Deeds –in which case it should then be placed with the Title Deeds as otherwise problems can arise if it becomes separated – or the Land Registry depending on the title. Again if in any doubt as to the procedure which in some cases can be quite complicated it might be as well to consult a Solicitor to attend to this.


One can also buy out the Ground Rent by way arbitration if the Landlord is unknown or cannot be contacted by getting in touch with the Ground Rents section of the Property Registration Authority.


LegalEagleStar  Wednesday ,  2nd  March,  2011

Written by LegalEagleStar

March 2, 2011 at 2:42 pm

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